Recently in Counterterrorism Category

My last email for 2008 at 11:56pm was to send a proposal to editor David Barker for the excellent series 33 1/3 which features 25-35k-word analyses of influential and important music albums.  33 1/3's reputation means David and his publishing team will probably be swamped with proposals.  On vacation, David is hopefully far away from a computer.

I've seen proposals from several colleagues, and they have chosen some really intriguing albums that I wouldn't have thought of.  So, whichever proposals David and his team choose to go with, you'll see some great 33 1/3 books by new writers in 2010 and 2011.

After the jump you can read an excerpt from my proposal, which reveals my album choice: I tried to go with something that is part of the recognised canon (both critical and commercial), which 33 1/3 has not covered before, and importantly, to try and suggest why the book would have significance to a broader readership.  Some of the album's themes are hot topics in the media's issue-attention cycle, and after sending the proposal in, I found David Cole's great article from The New York Review of Books' forthcoming issue.  The proposal doesn't hinge on this hot topic, it's just interesting to see changes unfold in the macro environment.

Enjoy, and let me know what you think.

Several weeks ago I noticed new graffiti on street signs in the Melbourne suburb Northcote from an unknown group: the Saracen Soldiers.  A block away from the most prominent graffiti two houses displayed nationalist flags in their front windows.  It could have been coincidence or maybe a signalling game to establish psychological turf.

At the time I thought of the ominous graffiti in Philip K. Dick's posthumously published novel Radio Free Albemuth (1985).  The grafiti also reminded me of the wanna-be teenage mercenaries in Leo Berkeley's film Holidays on the River Yarra (1990), who are recruited by a racialist organisation to engage in graffiti, brawls and other low-level politically motivated violence.

Two nights ago police fatally shot 15-year-old Tyler Cassidy during a confrontation in Northcote's All Nations park.  Earlier that evening, Cassidy left home after a family argument then stole two knives from Northcote's Kmart store.  Four police were called to arrest Cassidy and Victoria Police will now investigate what happened next.  As Rosie X observes, several media outlets speculated about Cassidys membership in the nationalist group Southern Cross Soldiers (SCS) and posed a 'suicide by cop' explanation for Cassidy's death.

There are a couple of interesting things to note about blogosphere and media coverage.

Journalists described Cassidy's online life as "subterreanean" - a mix of Sherry Turkle's theories about online identity fused with cyberterrorist fears - yet did not link to Cassidy's MySpace page or mention the SCS sites above.  In contrast, Richard Metzger observed to me in 1998 that Disinformation had a different strategy: it would link to white supremacist groups such as Aryan Nations so that readers would understand their ideological worldview.  This got Metzger into trouble with several anti-racialist organisations who confused him with Tom Metzger of White Aryan Resistance.

Anarchist and anti-racialist bloggers knew SCS for months before Cassidy's death as a white supremacist gang or youth network. The SCS band has copied Rahowa's white separatist music as a recruitment strategy.  The social network Bebo has pages for SCS recruitment and the SCS band.  Jacques Ellul would be proud: SCS (and perhaps Cassidy unwittingly) use a blend of Australian historical imagery for in-group identity and integration propaganda ("Aussie pride", the Southern Cross flag, conflation of national identity with ethnicity) with agitation propaganda that is aimed at specific out-group enemies (Italians, Lebanese, anyone who does not meet SCS's criteria for being Australian).

Several questions: How many other pages are there?  Who has been monitoring them?  What if any threat assessments were made?  Will anyone get an opportunity to conduct a sociometry analysis of SCS's online social network before the pages are pulled (Marc Sageman established a benchmark with his study of Salafist cells that may have had weak ties to Al Qaeda).

Bloggers and journalists alike noted that police might have de-escalated the incident if they were armed with a Taser electroshock weapon.  The incident captures why there is a tactical role under specific circumstances for law enforcement personnel to use non-lethal or less-lethal weapons that could have saved Cassidy's life.  The four police will likely receive critical incident debriefs and stress counselling.

A few days after Cassidy's death Northcote remains largely subdued apart from occasional police sirens in the distance.  In contrast. Greece has faced a week of riots after the shooting of 15-year-old Alexandros Grigoropoulos which may spread to Europe.  As a 'paired study' - SCS's street gang violence, the shootings of Grigoropoulos and Cassidy, and the divergent reactions - illustrate the late sociologist Charles Tilly's distinction between individual aggression (Cassidy), brawls (SCS) and scattered attacks (Greece) as different types of collective violence.

Tilly's urban sociology in the 1960s foresaw how today's social network sites may be used to coordinate street violence.  Perhaps police intelligence analysts would benefit from a few hours with Tilly's masterful study The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) to pre-empt any SCS revenge attacks for Cassidy's death.  SCS might then remain the purveyers of bad hip-hop/rock/metal hybrids (not exactly Australian), poorly designed web sites and street graffiti: the opportunist yet ineffectual extremists that Dick and Berkeley tried to warn us of . . . and that Greece and Europe may face again.

Counterterrorism analysts search for answers as the official death toll from Mumbai's siege rises to 183 people.  We now enter Susan Moeller's second stage of post-terrorist attacks: the hunt for the perpetrators and seeking justice.  See my October 2001 analysis here on the September 11 aftermath and Henry Rollins' reaction in New York City.

Slate's Anne Applebaum observes that we don't yet know much about the group that carried out the attacks.  Applebaum's analysis echoes Walter Laqueur's 'new terrorism' thesis in the mid-to-late 1990s: attempts at mass casualty attacks, tactics from the guerrilla and insurgency playbook, an ideological mix, and groups that either do not claim credit or who are not on the radar of counterterrorism analysts.  Applebaum captures Gregory Treverton's distinction between solvable 'puzzles' and potentially unsolvable 'mysteries' in intelligence analysis.

"The particulars of the attacking group are unknown; the political-military equation from which the group has almost certainly arisen is not," notes The New Yorker's Steve Coll.  The most plausible hypotheses for Coll and other counterterrorism experts are: (1) Pakistan's intelligence services may have funded the group in a clandestine/proxy war with India; or (2) the group emerged as an autonomous cell that was ideologically motivated by the clandestine/proxy war.  Coll explains why at this early stage the Mumbai siege is closer to Treverton's 'mysteries':

If past investigations into such groups prove to be any guide, it may be difficult to find clear-cut evidence of direct involvement by Pakistani intelligence or army personnel. This is because Pakistan, knowing the stakes of getting caught red-handed, has increasingly pursued its clandestine proxy war against India in Kashmir and on the Indian mainland through layers and layers of self-managing and non-state groups. The Pakistani government and its domestic Islamist proxies, including nominally peaceful charities based in Pakistan but with operations in Kashmir, almost certainly pass through money and weapons on a large scale. They do so, however, in such a way that is very difficult to trace these supplies back to the government.

Applebaum highlights the epistemological challenges that counterterrorism analysts face; Coll offers some guidance on how to conduct an investigation on the basis of 'contingent' beliefs and alternative hypotheses.

Pakistan's government denies any role in the Mumbai attacks.  Perhaps forensic analysis of crime scene evidence will provide answers and shift the current speculation from Treverton's 'mystery' to 'puzzle'.  Or maybe not.

The next day Coll analyses India's claim that the group Lashkar-e-Taiba was behind the Mumbai attack.